GTO2-4-06: Optimal Auctions

GTO2-4-07: More Advanced Auctions

GTO2-4-05: Revenue Equivalence

GTO2-4-04: Bidding in First-Price Auctions

GTO2-4-03: Bidding in Second-Price Auctions

GTO2-4-02: Auctions: Taxonomy

GTO2-4-01: Auctions: Taste

GTO2-3-06: Myerson-Satterthwaite Theorem

GTO2-3-05: Individual Rationality and Budget Balance in VCG

GTO2-3-02: Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanisms: Definitions

GTO2-3-04: Limitations of VCG

GTO2-3-03: VCG Example

GTO2-3-01: VCG: Taste

GTO2-2-06: Mechanism Design as an Optimization Problem

GTO2-2-05: Transferable Utility

GTO2-2-04: Impossibility of General, Dominant-Strategy Implementation

GTO2-2-03: Revelation Principle

GTO2-2-02: Mechanism Design: Implementation

GTO2-2-01: Mechanism Design: Taste

GTO2-1-07: Single-Peaked Preferences

GTO2-1-05: Social Choice: Arrow's Theorem

GTO2-1-06: Impossible of Non-paradoxical Social Choice Functions

GTO2-1-04: Social Choice: Impossibility of Non-Paradoxical Social Welfare Functions

GTO2-1-03: Social Choice: Paradoxical Outcomes

GTO2-1-02: Social Choice: Voting Schemes

GTO2-1-01: Social Choice: Taste

GTO-7-05: Comparing the Core and the Shapley Value in an Example

GTO-6-04: Analyzing Bayesian Games

GTO-6-02: Bayesian Games: First Definition

GTO-6-05: Bayesian Games: Another Example