Tomcats 4, Libya 0 - The Real Story of the Gulf of Sidra Incidents
Ward Carroll Ward Carroll
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 Published On Apr 22, 2021

A few decades before Gaddafi met his untimely demise at the hands of rebels, he made a sport out of provoking the U.S. Navy’s Sixth Fleet assets, primarily by claiming that the entire Gulf of Sidra was territorial Libyan water. He called the line along the northernmost part of the gulf the “Line of Death” and warned that any American ships or airplanes that crossed it would be met with the full force of the Libyan military.

Fighters from the aircraft carrier’s air wing would routinely fly inside the “Line of Death” as part of the American Navy’s “freedom of navigation” operations (aka “FON ops”) designed to prove a commitment to the conventions of international admiralty law that said that the Gulf of Sidra was, in fact, a gulf so therefore the only territorial waters that Libya could claim were those that extended 12 miles off the coastline.

FON ops were generally boring in that the Libyan military didn’t respond at all in spite of Gaddafi’s bluster. Fighters would spend hours on combat air patrol stations drilling holes in the sky without a single vector from the controllers in the early warning aircraft whose radar screens remained blip-free.

The first incident occurred on August 19, 1981 when two Tomcats from VF-41 shot down two Libyan Su-22 "Fitters" after the lead Fitter fired an errant Atoll missile.

The second incident occurred on January 4, 1989 when two F-14A Tomcats assigned to “The Swordsmen” of VF-32 flying off of the USS John F. Kennedy (CV 67) got the call to investigate two contacts that had launched out of Tobruk – a dream scenario for Cold War-era aviators, but one that also had a few dubious moments, particularly for the pilot and his radar intercept officer (RIO) in the lead aircraft.

The rules of engagement at that time were more lenient than previous Sixth Fleet rules had been in that a Libyan aircraft didn’t have to fire at an American to be declared hostile but simply if it had turned toward an American aircraft that had attempted to turn away three times.

The two Tomcats ultimately downed the Libyan MiG-23s after they appeared to jink into the flight more than three times, which met the ROE matrix for engagement in spite of the fact the battle group commander had indicated the weapons status was "yellow and hold."

According to Wikipedia, "The actual intent of the Libyan aircraft on 4 January is not known for certain. Details released three months after the incident revealed that the MiG-23s never turned on their onboard radars, needed to guide their AA-7 missiles at maximum range. The turns by the Libyan pilots prior to the first missile launch by the F-14s were considered too slight to be deemed hostile, according to U.S. House Armed Services Committee chairman Les Aspin.[14] Despite these findings, Aspin said the self-defense claim by the U.S. was still justified due to the continued acceleration of the MiG-23s as they closed the distance with the F-14s, and because Libya had a history of firing first."

While the crews earned the title of “MiG killers,” which makes them part of a rare breed in modern warfare, instructors at Top Gun summarized the lead aircraft’s performance in less than glowing terms, let’s say. It’s also telltale that Fighter Pilot of the Year honors that year did not go to Beads, the squadron skipper but instead went to Munster, the wing pilot, who was only a first-tour lieutenant at the time.

More here: https://www.military.com/off-duty/202...

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